MPH: Radio calls hinted at Norris conspiracy — if you didn't spot the hidden meanings

F1

McLaren's radio calls to Lando Norris were wildly misinterpreted at Spa, as F1 viewers missed the hidden meanings in Norris's messages and actions that activated various pre-agreed strategies. Mark Hughes explains

Lando Norris wearing headphones in McLaren F1 pit garage

Norris listens in at Spa ahead of the Belgian GP: McLaren ran the race to pre-agreed strategies - unknown to viewers at the time

McLaren

In this age of F1 coverage when so much live or semi-live information is available to the fan, it is paradoxically easier than ever to misunderstand what you are seeing. Given that it’s a sport which breeds conspiracy theories, this information access fuels the conspiracies more than disproving them. McLaren‘s choices around the Spa pitstops of Oscar Piastri and Lando Norris were a perfect case study in this.

When the time came – between laps 11-13 – to change from intermediate tyres to slicks, the sequence of events and radio instructions to each of their drivers led some to believe that Norris had been dealt an unfair hand by being left to do an extra lap on worn inters on a track which was into slick territory. There were others who scented conspiracy in Piastri not being given the same choice as Norris about which compound of slick he wished to be on. Let’s address the reality.

Pre-race, when all the possible scenarios are discussed, the situation of what would happen if they were running 1-2 at any inters-to-slicks pitstops was very much part of the discussion as the rain continued to fall. With just one practice session, there was even less certainty than usual about how the hard and medium tyre compared in both initial speed and range. The C1 hard — at two steps harder than the medium, as Pirelli tried to make it slow enough that a dry race would automatically be a two-stop — would easily have the range to do the full distance. The C3 medium probably wouldn’t. But how much slower would the C1 be? Slow enough that two C3 stints with an extra pitstop would be faster? Probably, yes, was the general feeling. As such, the medium was the preferred tyre going in.

With that established, it was an easy decision that in the event of running 1-2, the lead driver at the pitstops would take the medium. It was probably going to be sufficiently faster than the hard that it could make up the time of an extra stop. But what about the second driver? Bear in mind, as this was being discussed, there was no way of knowing who the first and second drivers were going to be. They’d locked out the front rows, but Piastri’s P2 starting slot has historically been a better place to be in the lead from at Spa than pole.

The choices also depended a lot upon how late in the race the changeover was going to be, of course. If it were late into the race, the hard would have no value. But if it was early? Say before lap 15 of the 44? Yes, the hard may be worth considering, as that might force the medium choice to involve an extra stop. The sequencing would also depend on where they were relative to the next non-McLaren. But McLaren’s pace on intermediates this year has been devastating (see Silverstone, where they had over 1sec per lap on the field with inters).

McLaren's British driver Lando Norris pits during the Belgian Grand Prix

Norris delayed his pitstop by a lap to take the hard tyres

Getty Images

When it became clear that the first phase of the race would be on inters, the likelihood was always that, barring mishaps, they were going to be a long way clear by the time it was time to change. So in sequencing terms, it was unlikely they’d need to pit the second car first to protect from an undercut from third. Therefore, it would be all about giving the prime choice to the lead driver. In terms of compound choice for the second driver: prime choice mediums, but with the possibility of going offset to whatever the leader did. Therefore, have the mediums ready as the prime choice, but with the possibility of the hards.

If, when the moment arrived, the second driver was going to opt for the hard, then it would take an extra lap to put the mediums back in the garage and replace them with the hards (only one set is allowed to be in the pitbox). So there was always going to be a further time loss with that extra lap, if the first driver’s stop had been perfectly timed. But that loss was unlikely to be anything like that of an extra pitstop (19-20sec). So it could still be worth doing.

You need to know all this to even begin to understand the context of the radio messages as that changeover moment arrived, with Piastri leading Norris by a couple of seconds and the rest of the field well behind. Piastri was told to pit and did so in the full knowledge he was being fitted with mediums – as per the pre-race plan for the lead driver in this situation. There was no need to offer him a choice. If he’d wished for hards, he would need to have communicated this early in the lap – before he even knew for certain this was his in-lap.

The timing was decided by Hamilton’s out-lap sector times on slicks being faster than his inters times – ie late in Piastri’s lap. Once he’d been told to pit there would be no logic in him asking for hards with no time to get them out of the garage. He knew the mediums were waiting for him; he knew the track was now ready for slicks. If he wanted the hards, he would know he would have to do an extra lap on his worn inters.

Lando Norris during the Belgian GP

Norris felt offset tyre strategy gave him the best chance of beating Piastri

Getty Images

On the lap on which Piastri subsequently pitted, Norris radioed that he was ‘happy to stop’. Meaning he was satisfied that he didn’t consider it too wet for slicks – and that the pre-discussed options were now ‘live’. This was for the race engineer’s understanding, and without the context he possessed, the meaning sounds totally different.

Just before Piastri pitted Norris was then told to ‘box to overtake’ Piastri. Which tells us that the two race engineers were working independently, just as per the normal internal policy of letting each side of the garage race the other. But Piastri, as the lead driver, had been assigned priority. Which meant in this case he could choose. He chose to come in.

Had he not done so, Norris would have pitted instead – and taken the mediums. That would have undercut Norris into the lead. Piastri would have pitted on the next lap and chosen the hards. As soon as Norris saw Piastri pit, he then had the choice of coming in behind him, being stacked briefly and taking the same tyre choice as Piastri or staying out for the extra lap and taking the hards. He chose the latter. Effectively, him not pitting on the same lap as Piastri was informing his engineer that he was taking the hard.

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He’d decided the best chance of beating Piastri was by an offset tyre strategy, hoping Piastri would need an extra stop. That seemed a more likely route to victory than being able to pass him on track with the same tyres.

This wasn’t communicated by radio. Because there was no need. Norris knew the situation and the choice available to him, as did his engineer Will Joseph. On Norris’s in-lap Joseph checked whether Lando wished to take the hards. Norris replied in the affirmative. The mediums in the pitbox will have been returned to the garage at this point and replaced in the pitbox by the hards.

That’s all that happened. There was no conspiracy. Just a lot of rash conclusions based on less than full knowledge.

Now we’re back in Hungary where last year there was a Norris-related pitstop timing controversy around Piastri’s first victory. Furthermore, it’s a track layout – long, medium speed corners and high rear tyre deg – which should maximise McLaren’s superiority, so making it an almost certain intra-McLaren contest for victory. Stand by for more events which will be easy to misinterpret.