F1's Indy farce haunted Qatar but this time, there was no Max Mosley

F1

Tyre troubles at the Qatar GP brought back memories of F1's disastrous experience at Indianapolis, writes Mark Hughes. But unlike the 2005 race, politics weren't at play

Why was he so determined for the race to fail? It was convenient for at least two reasons. There was an ongoing struggle for control of the sport playing out between the automotive manufacturers on one side and the FIA (and Ecclestone) on the other. The Concorde Agreement was due to run out at the end of 2007 and for 2008 the manufacturers – Toyota, Mercedes, BMW, Renault, Honda – were threatening a breakaway series. What’s more, they were enticing the independent teams such as McLaren and Williams to come with them and the independents, upon hearing about a more equitable split of F1’s profits and more transparent management, were more than receptive. But what the manufacturer group didn’t have, and the FIA did, was the support of Ferrari. Which carried enormous heft, of course. Ecclestone had in addition convinced Eddie Jordan and Minardi boss Paul Stoddard that they’d be better staying with him than joining the band of manufacturers.  

Tyre damage from kerbs led to introduction of stint limits in Qatar

Clive Rose/Getty Images

Author

Mark Hughes

Formula 1, the FIA and Pirelli together did a great job of rescuing a potential debacle at Qatar last weekend as the Losail circuit’s ‘pyramid’ kerbs wreaked havoc with the tyres.

But when the first murmurings of the problem began to be heard, there was an awful feeling of deja-vu and it was resonating with the Michelin Indianapolis 2005 debacle. On that occasion, the inability of the Michelin construction to withstand the combined lateral and vertical forces of the long, banked final corner for more than 10 laps or so resulted in the race being contested only by the six Bridgestone-shod cars of Ferrari, Jordan and Minardi. Fans understandably were enraged, most of them walking out during the race, some throwing beer cans onto the track on their way to demand their money back. It need not have ended that way; there was a way around the technical problem. But the FIA President of the time, Max Mosley, resolutely refused to take it. Because the drama met too many of his power play agendas of the time.

This time around, there were no serious heavy conflicts between teams, governing body and commercial rights holders and once Pirelli had identified the problem and notified the FIA, a workable solution was found and we had a grand prix. A slightly unusual one, it must be said, with a limit on the number of laps for each set of tyres. It changed the strategy game fundamentally and the three stops the tyre limitation imposed meant drivers were able to go flat-out between the pitstops rather than managing tyres so as to avoid an extra pitstop — which is normally the quickest way to the flag.

Overhead view of Williams pitstop at 2023 Qatar Grand prix

The mandated three stops in Qatar enabled flat-out racing

Williams

Back in 2005, once a tyre failure had put Ralf Schumacher heavily into the wall and Michelin discovered that its tyres were not able to withstand the combination of vertical and lateral loads for a conventional length of stint, there were various arguments about how to solve the immediate problem. One was a chicane through that turn which would have switched the problem off and was the obvious right solution. Another was to limit the number of laps the Michelin-shod cars could do on a set of tyres. That was unpopular with everyone apart from the three Bridgestone teams. Bernie Ecclestone — whose priority was to keep the show going — wanted the chicane solution but perhaps for the first time was over-ruled by FIA president Mosley. The president made several justifications for his refusal to countenance any of the proposed solutions — it would have insurance implications, it didn’t accord with FIA regulations on notice given for track changes — all of which were spurious.

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Why was he so determined for the race to fail? It was convenient for at least two reasons. There was an ongoing struggle for control of the sport playing out between the automotive manufacturers on one side and the FIA (and Ecclestone) on the other. The Concorde Agreement was due to run out at the end of 2007 and for 2008 the manufacturers – Toyota, Mercedes, BMW, Renault, Honda – were threatening a breakaway series. What’s more, they were enticing the independent teams such as McLaren and Williams to come with them and the independents, upon hearing about a more equitable split of F1’s profits and more transparent management, were more than receptive. But what the manufacturer group didn’t have, and the FIA did, was the support of Ferrari. Which carried enormous heft, of course. Ecclestone had in addition convinced Eddie Jordan and Minardi boss Paul Stoddard that they’d be better staying with him than joining the band of manufacturers.

Quite by coincidence, Ferrari, Jordan and Minardi were the only three teams on Bridgestones and thus unaffected by the Michelin problem. It seemed it was just too delicious a coincidence for Mosley to ignore. Throughout the long-running arguments about the sport’s future, the trump card the manufacturers believed they had was that the FIA could not possibly run a competing world championship with only three teams. Indianapolis 2005 gave Mosley the perfect opportunity to demonstrate that he was absolutely serious in his intention to do so if necessary.

Six cars on the grid for the start of 2005 United States Grand Prix

Six cars line up for the start at Indianapolis ’05, while the rest of the grid pulls into the pits

Christopher Lee/Getty Images

Secondly – and less importantly – there was the irritating matter of the tyre war. Neither Ecclestone nor Mosley wanted it. They wanted a control tyre supplier. The tyre war was costing the teams millions because they were having to conduct the tyre development testing. As the teams fought Ecclestone for a greater share of F1’s income, one very powerful argument they could present was that their costs were ramping up enormously because of the tyre war. So rather than pay the teams more money, Ecclestone and Mosley would far rather they simply eliminated that cost. Michelin had always been much more belligerent and unbending to the FIA’s control than Bridgestone. It was quite obvious that in any future F1 control tyre, the FIA’s preference would be for Bridgestone. Amplifying the impact of Michelin’s technical problem at Indianapolis by running with only three teams maximised Michelin’s embarrassment and aided immeasurably in the imposition of a control tyre. Which would in time impose a style of racing where the drivers were no longer flat-out between stints… Michelin announced its withdrawal at the end of the season.

The whole Indianapolis 2005 episode was a disgrace, where Mosley’s political machinations of power overrode the interests of the paying fan to the extent that the fans just became collateral damage. Fans who in many cases had saved up for this special event and travelled hundreds, even thousands of miles. It could so easily have been avoided but one man chose not to avoid it. Thankfully, any current day power struggles are not fought with such contempt for the fanbase. But it was also the day the tyre war died and we are feeling the implications of that still. F1 has just renewed its single supply contract with Pirelli until the end of 2027.

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